Introduction
Sensitive data is often protected by controlling access to its container. Two examples of containers are databases and file systems. Typically, databases are based on the relational model, whereas file systems are modeled as trees whose inner nodes are directories and whose leaves are files. For both examples, there are access-control models and systems (e.g., [3, 6, 11, 25] ) that take the inner structure of the respective container into account and thus allow for fine-grained access control. This means that access is not granted or denied to a database or a file system as a whole, but rather to individual tables or rows of the database and to individual directories or files of the file system.
A third example of a data container is a document. When documents are protected by controlling access to the file system where they reside, users either have full access to a document or no access at all. However, in some contexts (cf. §2), fine-grained access control is also required for documents. There exist access-control models for a specific class of documents, namely Extensible Markup Language (XML) [29, 12, 20] documents (cf. §5). However, most of these models are limited to XML-encoded databases. Furthermore, the systems based on these models cannot protect data once it has been released to users.
What has been missing until now is an access-control system that is based on a fine-grained access-control model for documents, such as texts, spreadsheets, and presentations, and whose mechanisms not only enforce policies on a server but also on clients, both while data is within documents and in transit between documents. In this technical report 0 , we present a formal model of such a system.
Contributions
We have defined a fine-grained model of a system for processing documents. As natural languages and semi-formal modeling languages like UML are not sufficiently precise, we have used the specification language Z [17] to define the states and operations of the system. Hence our first contribution is a formal model of an unprotected document-processing system.
Our second contribution is a policy language that allows users to formalize protection requirements that we have gathered for banking environments. Again we have taken a formal approach here and defined the policy language's abstract syntax in Z and its semantics (how access requests are evaluated) in a combination of (Object-)Z and the specification language Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [14] called CSP-OZ [8] .
Our third contribution is to provide a foundation for controlling usage of documents. Usage control [23] is a notion that subsumes both server-side and client-side access control. 1 It is important in the document context as owners need assurance that the policies governing access to their documents are respected, even when other users incorporate parts of these documents in their own documents. To achieve this, we associate parts of each document with the respective parts of its policy and maintain this association over the document life-cycle. This amounts to a fine-grained variant of the sticky-policies paradigm [18, 16] : when content is copied (or cut) from a document to the clipboard and pasted into a document, then so is the respective part of the policy (cf. Figure 1 ).
Organization
In Section 2, we explain the context of this work and we derive high-level requirements from representative use cases. In Section 3, we introduce our document model and we formalize document content. In Section 4, we formalize document policies and their enforcement. In Section 5, we compare with related work, and we draw conclusions in Section 6.
Requirements
Documents take many forms and serve many purposes. In this technical report, we will restrict our focus to a setting common in the context of companies and other organizations. Stakeholders in these companies (i.e., users) create, exchange, read, and edit documents that contain security-sensitive data.
In general, users cannot be trusted by the company because they may not understand the company's security requirements, they may be careless in their use of data, they may have an untrustworthy platform (e.g., compromised by a Trojan horse), or they may simply be untrustworthy themselves.
In what follows, we will assume that systems are trustworthy but users are not. That is, we focus on the functional security requirements for document processing necessary to handle careless or dishonest users. We will restrict our attention to the following representative use cases:
Annual Report: To mitigate the risk of insider trading, public access to the company's annual report must not be granted until a given date.
Company Guidelines: Before employees are granted access to data, they must first acknowledge the company guidelines governing the handling of that data.
Presentation Slides: Presenters must be able to define different rules (policy) for different parts (content) within one and the same presentation document so that they need not create multiple differently censored versions.
From the first use case, we derive the requirement for conditional access control, i.e., for access-control decisions that depend on request parameters other than the subject, the object, and the action. From the second use case, we derive the requirement for provisional access control, i.e., for access-control decisions that depend on whether provisions have been made. From the third use case, we derive the requirement for fine-grained access control, i.e., for access-control models and systems where the objects protected are not the data containers (in our case documents) as a whole, but rather their constituent parts. We can derive the same requirements in other document-processing contexts. Examples include the review process of papers, the distribution of sample chapters of books, and the acceptance (or not) of end-user license agreements.
A notion related to provisions is obligations. Roughly speaking, provisions must hold when access is granted, while obligations must hold after access has been granted [4, 5, 13] . For example, a subject may be obliged not to disclose any information learned as a result of being granted access to some data. Since, by definition, this obligation cannot be enforced technically at the time of access, it is mapped to a provision which can be, namely the subject must have signed a non-disclosure agreement. Our model will not directly support obligations, but will support both conditions and provisions.
Document Content Model
In our model, documents are pairs consisting of a content component and a policy component. The content is where the data is stored and the policy describes what operations are allowed on both the content and the policy itself. Further components-which we do not model in this technical report-are either application-specific (e.g., a style sheet) or related to the security mechanisms (e.g., encrypted component-decryption keys). We model the content component in this section and the policy component in the next.
We have formalized our model in Z, which is a popular formal language based on typed set theory and first-order logic with equality. We have chosen Z as document processing is heavily data-oriented and Z is well-suited for data modeling. In particular, Z provides constructs for structuring and compositionally building data-oriented specifications: schemas are used to model the states of the system (state schemas) and operations on the state (operation schemas), and a schema calculus is provided to compose these subspecifications.
Content Model
Many kinds of content are structured hierarchically. For example, a book consists of chapters, sections, and paragraphs. To reflect this, we model content as a rooted tree whose nodes have attributes (i.e., name-value pairs). This model 6
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is quite general and we can easily specialize it not only to different document formats, like XML (cf. Appendix A), but also to directory information bases and to file systems (cf. §3.2).
Data Types and Auxiliary Functions
We introduce four data types: Name and Value are basic types. Name represents the set of attribute names and Value the set of attribute values. As we shall see, security-sensitive data is stored as attribute values. Attributes is the set of finite sets of name-value pairs in which a name maps to at most one value, i.e., members of this type are functions mapping finitely many names to values. Finally, Tree is a recursive type where each node has attributes and a sequence of subtrees. In Z, we express all this as follows:
[Name, Value] Attributes == Name → Value Tree ::= Node Attributes × seq Tree
We have specified several auxiliary functions on these data types, which we will use below: Given a tree, the following function returns the set of all valid paths in the tree.
TreeDomainF : Tree → P seq N 1 ∀ a : Attributes; ts : seq Tree • TreeDomainF(Node(a, ts)) = { } ∪ {i :
Given a tree and a valid path, the following function returns the subtree at (the end of) the path.
ReadNodeF : Tree × seq N 1 → Tree ∀ t : Tree • ReadNodeF(t, ) = t ∀ p : seq 1 N 1 ; a : Attributes; ts : seq Tree | first(p) ≤ #ts • ReadNodeF(Node(a, ts), p) = ReadNodeF(ts(first(p)), tail(p))
Given a tree and a valid path, the following function returns the attributes of the root node of the subtree at the path.
ReadAttributesF : Tree × seq N 1 → Attributes ∀ t : Tree; p : seq N 1 ; a : Attributes; ts : seq Tree | ReadNodeF(t, p) = Node(a, ts) • ReadAttributesF(t, p) = a
Given two trees and a path, the following function returns the tree that results from adding the second tree to the first tree at the path. The following function returns the absolute value of its integer argument.
Content Model
AbsValF : Z → N ∀ z : Z | z < 0 • AbsValF(z) = −z ∀ z : Z | z ≥ 0 • AbsValF(z) = z
Containers (State) and Initialization Operations
The state of documents and the clipboard are represented as schemas. As mentioned in Section 1.1, making the clipboard and the clipboard-related operations part of the model is a prerequisite for fine-grained sticky policies. The first schema below represents the content component of documents. The second schema represents the content component of the clipboard. Both consist of a single binding stating that the document content is a tree called root and the clipboard content is a tree called cCache.
DocumentContent root : Tree

ClipboardContent cCache : Tree
In general, each state schema comes with an initialization schema that specifies the initial state and establishes the state invariants. In the case of document content and clipboard content, the empty node is assigned to the root and the cache.
The InitDocumentContent operation is the first operation to be performed when a new document is created. Since the policies are sticky, performing the Init-ClipboardContent operation is only necessary to set the clipboard into a correct state (e.g., when the document processor is started up), not for security reasons.
Operations
We have defined more than a dozen operations, most of which change the state of the document, the clipboard, or both. They are reading, adding, deleting, copying, cutting, and pasting a node as well as reading, adding, deleting, changing, copying, cutting, and pasting an attribute. Reading a node is special in that it returns the names of its attributes and the number of its children, but not any value. There is no change-node operation. Note that our convention is that schemas whose names end in C or P specify a content-related operation and a policy-related operation, respectively. 8
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Reading a node means discovering its structure (i.e., the names of its attributesbut not their values-and its number of children). 2 The precondition is that the path given is valid. The number of children is determined by taking the last element of the rightmost child's path.
ReadNodeC
ΞDocumentContent path? : seq N 1 attributesDom! : P Name childrenNr! : N path? ∈ TreeDomainF(root) attributesDom! = dom ReadAttributesF(root, path?)
Adding a node means not just adding an empty node, but a subtree. The preconditions are that the parent exists and that the new child will either be the first child or that all children left of it exist. Deleting a node means deleting the subtree rooted at that node. Note that we take advantage of the DeleteNodeC operation basically being the inverse of the AddNodeC operation. Nevertheless, we must explicitly specify the precondition, namely that the path given is valid. Copying a node results in the subtree rooted at that node being cached in the clipboard. The precondition is that the path given is valid. The copy semantics is by value (i.e., not by reference).
DeleteNodeC
CopyNodeC
ΞDocumentContent ∆ClipboardContent path? : seq N 1 path? ∈ TreeDomainF(root) cCache = ReadNodeF(root, path?)
Cutting a node means copying the node followed by deleting it. Note that because of DeleteNodeC's precondition, the sequence path? must not be empty.
Pasting a node means adding the tree cached in the clipboard. The preconditions are implicit in the first conjunct and in the AddNodeC operation. Reading an attribute means reading its value. The preconditions are that the path given is valid and that the name is in the domain of the respective node's attributes. Adding an attribute means adding a value under a new name. The preconditions are that the path given is valid and that the name is not already in the domain of the respective node's attributes. Note that the operation neither changes the tree structure nor the attributes of the other nodes. Changing an attribute means deleting the attribute followed by adding an attribute with the name of the deleted attribute.
ReadAttributeC
Copying an attribute results in the attribute value being cached in the clipboard under its current name, the latter being irrelevant though (cf. PasteAt-tributeC).
CopyAttributeC
ΞDocumentContent ∆ClipboardContent path? : seq N 1 name? : Name
Cutting an attribute means copying the attribute followed by deleting it.
Pasting an attribute means adding the attribute value cached in the clip-
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board under a new name. The preconditions are implicit in the first conjunct (exactly one attribute is cached in the clipboard) and in the AddAttributeC operation.
PasteAttributeC ∆DocumentContent ΞClipboardContent path? : seq N 1 name? : Name
Example Refinements
In Section 1.1, we claimed that our content model encompasses containers other than documents. In this subsection, we support this claim by refining the above-defined data types and state schemas to a generic file system on the one hand and to a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)-compliant directory information base on the other hand. Unlike the proof-of-concept refinement to XML documents (cf. Appendix A), we provide these two refinements for illustrative purposes only and therefore refrain from refining the operations as well.
File System
Two kinds of attributes found in file systems are name attributes (whose value is the name of the directory or file) and value attributes (whose value is the content of the file).
nameName, valueName : Name nameName = valueName
Directories have a name, no value, further attributes (e.g., the time of creation), and children. Files have a name, a value, further attributes (e.g., the MIME type), and no children.
The above definition of directories still allows for them to have children other than directories or files. In a file system, however, we only find directories or files.
Of the operations we defined for documents, even copy, cut, and paste make sense for file systems, either to duplicate a directory or file within the same file system or to check it out into another. For obvious reasons, the document model lacks an execute operation; however, if the file system represents a revision control system such as Subversion 3 or CVS 4 , none is needed.
LDAP Directory
One kind of attributes found in directory services are name attributes (whose value is the name of the entry).
RDN : Name
Entries have a relative distinguished name (RDN), further attributes with one or more values, and children.
[SValue] Value == P 1 SValue Entry == {t : Tree | (∃ a : Attributes; ts : seq Tree | RDN ∈ dom a • t = Node(a, ts))}
The above definition of entries still allows for them to have children other than entries. In a directory information base, however, we only find entries.
DirectoryInformationBase DocumentContent
∀ p : TreeDomainF(root) • ReadNodeF(root, p) ∈ Entry
Document Policy Model
In this section we present our policy language and access-control architecture. We have designed the language to meet our domain-specific requirements for controlling access to document content (as just modeled). Our architecture is an adaptation of the XACML data-flow model [22] . We first present these ideas informally and afterwards present the formal specification.
Informal Description
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Policy Language
Our access-control model is role-based, where policies express relations between roles and permissions and where subjects are users acting in a role. Additionally, policies incorporate a concept of ownership adapted from discretionary access control (DAC), where every object has an owner, namely the user that created it. Users are allowed all forms of access to objects they own and can arbitrarily add and delete role-permission assignments for these objects as well. However, unlike DAC models, our model does not leave to a subject's discretion any data the subject has (read) access to.
Permissions relate objects with actions (not to be confused with operations) that are further constrained by conditions and provisions. That is, permissions only apply when the condition evaluates to true in the current environment. As their name implies, permissions always grant access. Nevertheless, grants are tentative until the provisions have been made. By design, conflicts (i.e., different sets of provisions) cannot arise from more than one permission applying to a request and as a result there is no need for conflict-resolution strategies. Subjects can be permitted to delegate their reading and editing permissions to other subjects.
We limit ourselves to a single editing action, which we call change. This is in contrast to other models (cf. §5), which typically have the actions add, delete, and update (when integrity is a concern). In our model, to add or delete a child node or an attribute, a subject must be allowed to change the parent. Let us discuss the change action in more detail. Table 1 lists the operations permitted by our change action and by the usual add, delete, and update actions. We claim that giving add, delete, and update permissions individually is unsatisfactory, in particular in the context of document editing which requires the ability to undo operations. Suppose, for example, that a subject has the permission to add an object to a node. Undoing adding an attribute or a node could be supported by giving the subject the permission to delete the attribute or the node. However, the permissions required to undo pasting an attribute or a node (i.e., a subtree) are less clear. Similarly, does deleting a node require the permission to delete all descendants of the node? And does deleting an object require the permission to read the object? Now suppose that a subject has the permission to delete an object but not the permission to add an object to the object's parent node. Can deleting the object be undone without giving the subject "new" (add) permissions on "old" nodes? We avoid these questions with our approach and instead provide users with a simple semantics of an editing action whose consequences are easy to understand: a subtree can either be changed in arbitrary ways or not at all. Note that this simplification has no negative effects when confidentiality is the main security goal, as it is in the use cases in Section 2.
Access-Control Architecture
The architecture of our system is an adaptation of the XACML data-flow model [22] and is shown in Figure 2 . The system runs on a User's client. Content and Policy are components of a document that the user has opened with the system. When several documents are open, only one is currently active. After successful login, the user is represented by a Subject and accesses documents through the user interface (UI). If security were not a concern, there would be no policy and the UI would directly access the document application programming interfaces (APIs) 5 when reading and writing content. However, since security is indeed a concern, the UI accesses the document APIs via the policy enforcement point (PEP). The PEP grants or denies access (i.e., blocks operations) based on access decisions made by the Policy Decision Point (PDP) and based on whether certain provisions have been made, for which the PEP consults the Provisions Service. That is, the PEP mediates access while the PDP makes (tentative) access decisions.
Formal Specification
Data Types
The most elementary concepts of any access-control model are subjects, objects, and actions. In our model, subjects are pairs consisting of a role ID and a user ID. The set of all role IDs and the set of all user IDs are basic types of the specification. Objects are nodes or attributes at a given path. The ability to speak about nodes and attributes at arbitrary positions in the document content is straightforward, given our content model, and allows for fine-grained access control. We have defined four actions: read, change, print, and delegate.
Permissions with read actions grant read operations. Permissions with print actions grant the print operation (cf. §4.4). Permissions with delegate actions grant subjects the operation which delegates their readand change-based permissions to other subjects (i.e., the permission to print or delegate cannot be delegated). The permissions with change actions grant add and delete (and thus change, cut, and paste) operations. The prerequisite for granting any operation is that a read operation would be granted, too. The applicability of permissions can be limited by conditions on the environment and user. For now, time is the only environmental property modeled. To satisfy a condition, the request environment must be in the condition's set of environments and the requesting user must be in the condition's set of users. Time-dependent permissions are motivated by the use cases given in Section 2. User-dependent permissions are necessary for delegation. For example, if a manager wants to delegate some of her permissions to her secretary (but not to all employees whose role is secretary) she can make the delegated permissions depend on the secretary's user ID.
We support two kinds of provisions: log and sign. 6 When a permission depends on a log provision, the system providing access must log the message specified in the provision before access can be granted. When a permission depends on a sign provision, the user requesting access must have signed the agreement specified in the provision before access can be granted. Examples for agreements are end-user license agreements and non-disclosure agreements as well as company guidelines. The set of all messages and the set of all agreement IDs are basic types of the specification. Now we have specified all components of permission tuples. Given the request parameters, the PDP checks whether a permission matches the request. If so, the PDP responds with Grant and the permission's set of provisions and if not, the PDP responds with Deny. 
Containers (State) and Initialization Operations
The first schema shown below specifies what constitutes the policy component for documents. Its predicate states that permissions with the action change must have a node as object and that at most one permission can match a given request. The second schema specifies what constitutes the policy component for the clipboard. Both schemas declare variables of the same type: a partial, finite function that maps objects to their owner and the role-permission relation for role-based access control.
Using Z's schema calculus, here schema conjunction, we can now formally express that both documents and the clipboard are pairs consisting of a content component and a policy component (cf. the pairs depicted in Figure 1 ).
The InitDocumentPolicy is the first operation to be performed when a new document is created. Since the policies are sticky, performing the InitClipboard-Policy operation is only necessary to bring the clipboard into a correct state (e.g., when the document processor is started up), not for security reasons. 
Operations on Nodes and Auxiliary Functions
Reading a node has no effect on the document's policy.
ReadNodeP ΞDocumentPolicy
Adding a node results in the user adding the node becoming the owner of the node as well as of all its descendants and in potentially shifting existing object addresses. To reduce the complexity of the AddNodeP schema, we have specified three auxiliary functions: Given a tree and a valid path within that tree, the following function returns the children of the root node of the subtree at that path. 18 
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Given the ID of the user who adds the node, the address of where the node is being added, the node's attributes, and the node's children, the following function returns ownership information to be added to the policy. That is, the set of all pairs whose first element refers to the node or one of its descendants and whose second element is the user ID is returned.
Given an object (i.e., a reference in the policy to a node or an attribute in the content) and the address of where the node is being added, the following function returns the object that references the same node or attribute in the tree with the added node. Deleting a node results in all ownership information and all permissions related to the node as well as to all its descendants being removed and in existing object addresses potentially being shifted. To reduce the complexity of the DeleteNodeP schema, we have specified one auxiliary function:
Given an object (i.e., a reference in the policy to a node or an attribute in the content) and the address of where the node is being deleted from, the following function returns the object that references the same node or attribute in the tree with the deleted node. Copying a node changes the clipboard policy but not the document policy. As specified in CopyNodeC on page 8, the subtree being copied becomes the tree in the clipboard content. Therefore, the common path prefix (path?) is removed in the course of copying those parts of the document policy related to the subtree being copied. With respect to the content, pasting a node basically means adding the node cached in the clipboard (via the AddNodeC operation). With respect to the policy, it is not; ownership information and permissions are not generated but pasted as well. To reduce the complexity of the PasteNodeP schema, we have specified two auxiliary functions:
Given an object to user mapping and the address of where the node is to be added, the following function returns the object to user mapping that provides the same ownership information in the tree with the added node.
Given a role-permission relation and the address of where the node is to be added, the following function returns the role-permission relation in the tree with the added node. Now we can formally express that reading, adding, deleting, copying, cutting, and pasting a node are transactions operating simultaneously on both the content and policy components.
Formal Specification
ReadNode = ReadNodeC ∧ ReadNodeP AddNode = AddNodeC ∧ AddNodeP DeleteNode = DeleteNodeC ∧ DeleteNodeP CopyNode = CopyNodeC ∧ CopyNodeP CutNode = CutNodeC ∧ CutNodeP PasteNode = PasteNodeC ∧ PasteNodeP
Operations on Attributes
Reading an attribute has no effect on the document's policy.
ReadAttributeP ΞDocumentPolicy
Adding an attribute results in the user adding the attribute becoming the owner of the attribute. Changing an attribute (i.e., its value) has no effect on the document's policy. The owner is still the user who added the attribute, and the user who made the change does not gain any additional permissions.
ChangeAttributeP ΞDocumentPolicy
Note that ChangeAttributeP cannot be defined analogously to ChangeAttributeC (i.e., not as DeleteAttributeP o 9 AddAttributeP). Copying an attribute changes the clipboard policy but not the document policy. As specified in CopyAttributeC on page 10, the attribute being copied becomes the only attribute in the clipboard content's root node. Therefore, the path (path?) is removed in the course of copying those parts of the document policy related to the attribute being copied. With respect to the content, pasting an attribute basically means adding the attribute cached in the clipboard (via the AddAttributeC operation). With respect to the policy, it is not; ownership information and permissions are not generated but pasted as well. Now we can formally express that reading, adding, deleting, changing, copying, cutting, and pasting an attribute are transactions operating simultaneously on both the content and policy components.
Policy-specific Operations
So far, the policy-related operations specify side effects that operations primarily related to the content have on the policy. When users perform these operations, they do so with the content in mind. In contrast, the next three operations are policy-specific and have no effect on the content whatsoever. They are adding a role-permission mapping, deleting a role-permission mapping, and delegating a reador change-based permission.
Adding a role-permission mapping does not change any ownership information or existing role-permission mappings. The preconditions are that the policy invariants will be maintained (cf. DocumentPolicy on page 16). As far as updating the policy goes, delegating a permission to a role is equivalent to adding a new role-permission mapping. As we shall see below, these two operations differ in when they are granted.
DelegateEditPermission = AddRolePermission
Policy Interpretation
In classical access-control architectures, the PDP interprets the policy to decide whether access is granted and the PEP enforces this decision. As explained in Section 4.1.2, in architectures with support for provisions, the control flow is more complex and additionally involves interaction with a provisions service. We have specified the PDP and provisions service in Z: the PDP takes a request and a policy and responds with grant or deny, and the provisions service takes a set of provisions and responds with an empty set (denoting that all provisions have been satisfied) or with the set of provisions not yet satisfied.
Provisions Service
The provision service's state consists of a relation that states which user has signed which agreement (and which agreement has been signed by which user) and a sequence of log entries that states which user's access has caused which message to be logged. 
Policy Decision Point
The following characteristic set defines the predicate that expresses whether a given policy permits a given request:
That is, a policy permits a request if and only if the role of the request subject maps to exactly one permission in the policy such that the request object and the permission object are equal, that the request action and the permission action are equal, that the request environment is in the set of permission environments, and that the request user is in the set of permission users. Note that to support hierarchical role-based access control, we not only have to change this predicate, but also the AddRolePermission schema and DocumentPolicy's invariant as well as the auxiliary function GetProvisionSet below. Given a request and a policy, GetProvisionSet returns the set of provisions that must have been made for the request to be granted. The specification of GetProvisionSet relies on an auxiliary function, arb, that given a set with exactly one element returns that element:
The PDP evaluates requests while ignoring the hierarchical nature of the content. It is up to the PEP whether access to a node depends on access to all its ancestors or not. Except for the ChangeNodeRequest operation, which is internal to the PDP, the following request operations define the interface between PEP and PDP.
A read node request is (tentatively) granted if the subject requesting read access is the owner of the node or if the policy permits read access to the node. A change node request is (tentatively) granted if the subject requesting change access is the owner of the node or if the policy permits both read and change access to the node. The provisions that must have been made is the union of those that must have been made for a read access and of those that must have been made for a change access. A node can be pasted where it can be added.
ReadNodeRequest
ChangeNodeRequest
PasteNodeRequest = AddNodeRequest
A read attribute request is (tentatively) granted if the subject requesting read access is the owner of the attribute or if the policy permits read access to the attribute. Copy access to an attribute requires read access to it.
ReadAttributeRequest
CopyAttributeRequest = ReadAttributeRequest
Cut access to an attribute requires both copy and delete access to it. An attribute can be pasted where it can be added.
CutAttributeRequest
PasteAttributeRequest = AddAttributeRequest
Adding role-permission mappings can only be added and deleted by the Delegating a permission requires delegate access on the respective object, that the action is read or change, that the condition of the new permission is never true when the condition of the original permission would not be, and that the original provisions must also be made in the new permission. 
DelegateEditPermissionRequest
Policy Enforcement Point
The modeling requirements for the PEP are different than for the other subsystems. The UI is event-driven and the PEP must synchronize (interact) with the UI as well as the other architectural components and its control flow is datadependent. While Z is well-suited for data modeling, it cannot easily describe such process interaction. Therefore we employed CSP-OZ, which combines Z with the process calculus CSP as mentioned in the introduction. A CSP-OZ class describes both operations (in Z) and their synchronization 30
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(in CSP). The excerpt in Figure 5 formalizes the generic description given in Section 4.1.2 for the operation of reading a node. It leaves open the applicationspecific mechanisms of receiving events (e.g., ReadNode event) and of updating the UI (e.g., ReadNode ret). The other operations (copying a node, reading an attribute, etc.) are declared analogously. The formalization of the UI (cf. Figure 4) is similar but simpler than that of the PEP. CSP processes synchronize along so-called channels. Explicitly declared (chan) are the channels login, logout, and abort. Operations specified in Z are also channels. The UI and the PEP execute in parallel. At first, both processes are in the main loop (main) until a user successfully logs in, at which point they enter their event-processing loops (PEPL in the case of the PEP). When a user logs out via the UI, the PEP follows suit and returns to its main loop. Unlike the UI, the PEP must take additional steps between receiving an event and handling it or aborting, in order to make an access decision. First, it determines the current environment (GetEnv) and then it communicates with the PDP (via ReadNodeRequest) and, provided the PDP has not denied the request, with the provisions service (via MadeProvisions). The PEP signals access denied on the abort channel, which forces the UI to abort without having handled the event.
GetEnv 
Figure 4: User Interface
Hence the PEP class brings together the various Z specifications from before and formalizes how policies are interpreted and enforced. Overall, our model provides a precise description, with a formal mathematical semantics, of secure document processing, i.e., documents, operations on them, and access control.
Print Operation
We have postponed the discussion of the print operation until now because the content-related part cannot really be specified independent of the policyrelated part. 
Figure 5: Policy Enforcement Point
Given a printer as specified in the first schema below, a print operation could be simply defined as in the second schema if security were not a concern:
Printer output : Tree Print ΞDocument ∆Printer
Since security is a concern, one idea is to prune the document and print the pruned document along the following lines: should the user be told which provisions she could make to print more of a document? The answer is obviously application-specific. Therefore, we limit ourselves to specifying how print requests must be evaluated, but leave it to applications to make a trade-off between pruning and interacting with the user.
A print node request is (tentatively) granted if the subject requesting print access is the owner of the node or if the policy permits both read and print access to the node. The provisions that must have been made is the union of those that must have been made for a read access and of those that must have been made for a print access. Similarly, a print attribute request is (tentatively) granted if the subject requesting print access is the owner of the attribute or if the policy permits both read and print access to the attribute. The provisions that must have been made is the union of those that must have been made for a read access and of those that must have been made for a print access. 
PrintNodeRequest
PrintAttributeRequest
Related Work
A number of commercial document-processing systems offer security functionality, for example those of Adobe 7 and Microsoft 8 . In contrast to our work, these systems offer only coarse-grained protection. Moreover, once data is copied, it is at the user's discretion.
The work closest to ours is in XML access control, which is an active research area concerned with controlling access to constituent parts of XML documents (e.g., [7, 15, 19, 2, 1, 10, 9] ). We shall first discuss the primary characteristics of this work, and then examine several prominent proposals.
XML access control models are fine-grained, although the different proposals differ in their granularity and the types of their constituent parts. Moreover, they differ in the operations offered and their semantics. Some XML access control systems only provide a read operation with no arguments and thus expect their users to request entire XML documents (typically, there is only one instance, namely the XML-encoded database), in which case they respond with a censored copy called the view (Gabillon [9] compares several view-generation strategies). The current proposals differ considerably in the policy languages they offer, e.g., their features and syntactic sugar. Although these additions are intended to ease a policy writer's life, they are also a double-edged sword: they not only make the policy language more complex, they also necessitate conflictresolution strategies [7, 15, 19] . In contrast, we have focused on a simple, yet expressive, core language with a clean, formal semantics. All current proposals for XML access control are limited in that they leave data at the user's discretion once it is copied. In contrast, we have solved this problem by adapting the idea of sticky policies to our model.
The XML Access Control Language (XACL) [15, 19] has up to now been the only proposal for XML access control with concrete support for provisions. Our model differs from that of the XACL, in this respect, in that provisions never have to be made (not even by the system) when access is denied. More importantly, XACL policies may be ambiguous in terms of which provisions must hold for a given request. In our model, at most one permission matches a request, so there is no such ambiguity.
Bertino et al. [2, 1] have proposed an approach to XML access control consisting of two parts: an access-control system Author-χ, and a credentials and policy language χ-Sec. Their proposal goes beyond XML access control in that they actually consider semi-structured data encoded in XML documents. They allow arcs (i.e., references or hyperlinks) to be secured with what they call the navigate privilege (privileges are what we call actions). Our model does not encompass semi-structured data. However, arcs can be encoded as attributes (as is done in the XML), whereby read access can be interpreted as navigate access. This proposal has a rich language for expressing temporal conditions, based on periodic time expressions [21] ; from our requirements analysis, these are not necessary in our context.
Gabillon et al. [10, 9] go beyond XML access control and consider treestructured data. However, nodes in their trees have no properties other than child nodes. This has the unfortunate consequence that the policy language 34 A PROOF OF CONCEPT: XML DOCUMENTS must be adapted to every specialization. In contrast, we can refine our documentcontent model without changing our policy language. The work by Gabillon et al. [10, 9] is the only closely related work in which object ownership and policy editing are not foreign concepts, and permission delegation is supported as well. All other approaches assume that policies are schema-based, static, and provided by (not further specified) administrators.
Conclusion
We have presented a formal model of an access-control system for document security. This model reflects real-world requirements and provides a precise design for solving this problem in a general way. Hence it represents a large step towards a general-purpose document-security system.
As future work, we will take the remaining steps in building a prototype implementation. First, we shall define a concrete syntax for our policy language and implement a PDP that interprets this syntax and can evaluate requests. A likely candidate for the concrete syntax is an eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [22] profile in which case our PDP could be based on an existing XACML PDP, such as the one from Sun Microsystems Laboratories 9 . Because the XACML lacks a formal semantics, an alternative is to directly implement the PDP as a refinement of our formal model. Second, we will employ cryptographic mechanisms to secure documents during storage and while in transit so that only trusted systems can access them. Third, as a proof of concept, we will implement an XML editor along the lines of the architecture in Section 4.1.2 on page 14. Finally, we plan to embed the XML editor in a trustworthy client environment, where master keys are secured in Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) [27] . All of these steps are realistic and should contribute to a practical solution that represents a large advance in the way that documents, and more generally hierarchically structured content, are secured.
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A Proof of Concept: XML Documents
In this section, we refine the model for abstract documents to a model for XML documents. As we shall see, it suffices to refine the content model; the policy model need not be refined in any manner!
A.1 Data Types
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A.1 Data Types
First we reserve two attribute names. One for the attribute whose value-or non-existence-determines the type of XML node. And one for the attribute whose value determines the actual value of a comment node, processing-instruction node, or text node. nameName, valueName : Name nameName = valueName Then we reserve two attribute values. One for the name of comment nodes, which is "!--" in a standard XML encoding, and one for the name of processinginstruction nodes, which is "?". All other nameName attribute values denote tags in element nodes. Comments are nodes that have two attributes and no children. The two attributes are a nameName attribute with value commentNameValue and a value-Name attribute whose value is the actual comment. Processing instructions are also nodes that have two attributes and no children. The two attributes are a nameName attribute with value piNameValue and a valueName attribute whose value is the actual processing instruction. Elements are nodes that have one or more attributes and zero or more child nodes. One attribute is the nameName attribute whose value is the element's tag and the other attributes are the actual XML attributes, but none of the attributes is a valueName attribute. Texts are nodes that have one attribute and no child node. The attribute is a valueName attribute whose value is the actual text.
While we defined the set of comments for the sake of completeness, we do not include it in the set of XML nodes hereafter. XML comments are first and foremost a means for users to comment XML documents that they edit directly and can be ignored by XML parsers. In our context, users are never allowed to directly access an XML document's encoding.
A.2 Containers (State)
Except for the document root, an XML document consists of processing-instruction nodes, element nodes, and text nodes only. At most one element node, namely the root element, is a child of the document root. No text node is the child of the document root. And text nodes are never adjacent (cf. AddTextNodeC operation schema below).
XmlDocument DocumentContent
A policed XML document is a pair consisting of a plain XML document and a document policy.
PolicedXmlDocument = XmlDocument ∧ DocumentPolicy
A.3 Discovery Operations
The (abstract) ReadNodeC operation is wrapped by three discovery operations, one that returns a node's type, one that returns a document root's or element's number of children, and one that returns the domain of an element's attributes. Note that the policy-related component of the operations is the ReadNodeP operation and that the requests are equivalent to a read node request. According to the Document Object Model (DOM) specification [28] (which we abstract from), "[w]hen a document is first made available via the DOM, there is only one Text node for each block of text. Users may create adjacent Text nodes that represent the contents of a given element without any intervening markup, but should be aware that there is no way to represent the separations between these nodes in XML [...], so they will not (in general) persist between DOM editing sessions. The Node.normalize() method merges any such adjacent Text objects into a single node for each block of text." As we anticipate a security policy and do not want to worry about what it would mean to normalize rules referring to adjacent text nodes, we go further than the DOM in that in our model subjects cannot create them in the first place. Adding text is adding a new text leaf: 
GetTypeC
A.8 Remark
Several document formats are based on the XML. Thus, such documents can be secured by securing their XML-based encodings. Users could define applicationlevel policies whose objects are, for example, chapters, lists, etc., and the system would map them to XML-level policies as suggested in Figure 6 . ("XML-level policy" is a bit of a misnomer, though, as there is no need to refine our policy model to govern access to XML documents.) App-level Objects e.g., headers, paragraphs, footnotes XML-level Objects i.e., elements, attributes, PIs, texts
XML-level Policy
App-level Policy Furthermore, if the application-level document model is a refinement of the application-specific document could be directly modeled along the lines of AppSpecificDoc = AppDocContent ∧ DocumentPolicy.
